And on August 10, 1945 People Were Jumping To Conclusions
(August 10, 1945 - where even a rumor got the presses rolling)
(still pitching)
With the second Atomic Bomb dropped on Nagasaki the day before, all ears were turned in the direction of Japan for any word regarding a surrender.
On August 10th, listening posts picked up broadcasts from the NHK (the Japanese Broadcasting service) reporting that the Emperor (Hirohito) had agreed to a surrender proposal first made in Potsdam on the 26th of July.
The stipulation was the Emperor had to stay in place.
Well . . no, that wasn't the deal and there was no official confirmation of either the report or the Allies agreement to those terms.
But that didn't stop people from assuming the war was over as of August 10th, as this breathless set of bulletins from the Mutual Network (via WOR in New York) attested to. Needless to say, the White House quickly issued a statement that no such agreement was made and by the end of the day, the war was still on.
So August 10th 1945 was a bit manic.
What's rarely mentioned in the official US version of events is that the Soviet Union (by prior agreement with the Allies) declared war on Japan on August 9. The shock value of the surprise Soviet attack was as important -- if not more so -- than the atomic bombs. Many historians now agree that the shock value of the Soviet attack, combined with assurances the Emperor would not be tried as a war criminal, would have been enough to produce a Japanese capitulation before the invasion of Japan (scheduled for November). There were three full months available (with little fighting going on) to test this hypothesis. This is why so many top generals and admirals (like Eisenhower, MacArthur and Leahy) didn't think the bombs were necessary. As in the European war, the USSR gets shortchanged in US history books.
...IMO, the Soviets would get a lot more credit had they not been allies with the Nazis at the start of the war.
Don't try to confuse the issue with half-truths and gorilla dust.
It's interesting to consider that since less than a month earlier the Japanese were enlisting the Russians to broker a deal. I wonder though, if MacArthur was against the idea of using a bomb against Japan, why was he so gung-ho to use it in Korea, knowing the results?
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